Three classical philosophical topics, – being, truth and subject, – were dramatically recast by one of the most prominent contemporary European thinkers Alain Badiou (born 1937), who intervened recent debates with a decisively strong philosophical program built upon the necessity and possibility of attaching to these seemingly outdated categories. In this respect, it would be no exaggeration to say that the originality of Badiou’s philosophy is concentrated in his concept of event. There is arguably another ultimately sensitive to the problem of event philosophical project as the one by Alain Badiou. One may also depart from another Badiou’s claim, which can serve as a hypothesis in figuring out of the proposed concept’s originality. It is a statement about the «four conditions of philosophy» and eventful domains: politics, science, art and love . Badiou assures us that philosophical orientations towards these topics determine possibilities to think events.
Events are commonly regarded as something appearing in or through time. The question then arises of a minimal evidence of an event in time. The notion of change seems to be a good candidate for eventfulness. In its daybreak the Western philosophy gave birth to two concurred orientations regarding the possibility of change. One of them, represented by Heraclitus, admitted change as a fundamental attribute of all existing. Another great thinker, Parmenides made a risky and counterintuitive step assuming that the one of all being didn’t move or change at all. Thus, while Heraclitus justified the total becoming from the point of view of fluxible sensual appearances, and Parmenides argued on the supra-sensual grounds of being.
A theoretical task of thinking the processual being urged decisions concerning an appropriate language in which becoming could be expressed. Should it be based upon the fixed categories or be as fluid as appearances was always the question of language’s nature, representational or imitative, which is still discussed. Although similar attempts had been rare, one might recognize in Hegel’s system an exemplary simulation of becoming represented with an advance from one category to another. In general, there usually were more philosophers of being than philosophers of becoming, who can be counted on fingers: Heraclitus, probably stoics, Hegel, Nietzsche, Bergson, Deleuze.
In different indigenous and profound philosophers, we can find conflicting recognition of possibilities for changes: besides those, who admit only nil possibility, there are some, who claim that possibilities for changes are always limited, while others argue that such possibilities are limitless. Moreover, another big question originating disagreement concerning the problem of change is the question of a possibility of the new. This second aspect certainly radicalizes the thinking of change through ages.
In early 1900s two British philosophers and mathematicians A.N.Whitehead and B.Russell initiated contemporary discussion over a better understanding of what the scientifically studied world consisted of. B.Russell introduced a program of the «logical atomism», according to which there were three types of irreducible ontological entities composing all facts in the world – properties, relations and events.  Whitehead maintained that there were no good reasons to uphold an ontological priority of objects due to a lack of certainty about their spatial and temporal localization. Since coordinates (of objects) are thought in abstract geometrical terms of the dimensionless point, there is little physical sense in such approach. For Whitehead, speaking of fields correlating objects with each other and of processes is of much relevance. The world consists of events, which build compositions and sequences. Processes prevail over static states. 
Russell is also famous by his contribution to the discussion of the set theory and axiomatic formalization of arithmetic. The logicist project he had supported immediately approached the question of infinite sets. Since the logical possibility for this approach has been prior, the failure to define or construct an infinite set indicated impossibility of infinitude and inconsistency of its notion. Logic forbids infinite objects, which means either that there is not any or that nothing can be known about them. For instance, the physical Universe itself, according to the official science, appears finite. It means that it cannot expand forever, because of the finite amount of energy and matter and hence finite possibilities for events in the theoretical relativistic meaning. According to a pop-scientific scenario, one day the Universe is supposed to die and, maybe to begin its way back in time to the singularity.
In this regard, Badiou’s ontological explication of the set-theory is striking. He demonstrates that the inconsistent infinite multiplicity is precisely being as being, and that mathematics happened to be able to think the very presentation of being as multiple [4, p. 4].
Then, what about the potentially infinite? Unlike the ancient culture, contemporary science and hence positivistic philosophy presumes evolution. Evolution presumes a linear rather than a cyclic time and occurring of the new with its new possibilities rather than just a realization of possibilities. But there are assumed different types of evolution: evolution of life, geological evolution, evolution of the Universe. Though some general theories of evolution have been elaborated, it seems that yet it makes sense to regard each of particular evolutions more or less independently from others, unless the division between the animate and inanimate nature will have been removed with some holistic vision. Meanwhile, mostly non-scientific versions of such holistic vision are still prevailing in number. Hence, if it had been possible for something infinite to occur or develop in the finite Universe, would science be able to recognize that? It seems at least possible, although not inarguably, to scientifically think some emergent possibilities in the objective world due to which such complex phenomena as life and conscience can be explained complementary to the physical realm.
A significant impact on the philosophical theories of the second part of the XX century was the study of language. The relationship between the structures in language and the said by means of them things has had to be explored and explained. People live in the world of said and sayable things, which are usually confused with things as they are. It is impossible to tell what things are the way they are, so it remains only to study what the said things are. This is commonly the way the so-called «analytical philosophy» operates. The analytical philosophy suggests that, at least from the first reach, every conceptual problem may be examined as a question of the use of language, i.e. what accordingly to it can and cannot be said. Language expressions can indicate distinctions, which a language user implements for speaking of «natural species». It, hence, involves, if any, ways of specifying events from other entities in statements. Though there is no general consensus among analytical philosophers about the real existence of events, i.e. whether events merely correlate to ways of speaking or they are something in the world which one speaks about, the discussion as such promises an advance in understanding linguistic conditions for thinking of these entities in question. It is obvious that events can appear as subjects in sentences and be variously predicated. One can distinct between such sentences as: «The people joyfully celebrate the Independence Day» and «The celebration of the Independence Day by the people was joyful». Since the subject in the first sentence is «the people» and it is predicated with a «joyful celebration of the Independence Day», this sentence describes an object. However, the subject in the second sentence, «the celebration» («of the Independence Day by the people») is definitely an event rather than an object. It is taken as something possessing a property to be joyful, so that the statement presumes it as an independent referent. While some analytics insisted on the minimal ontology’s necessity to recast every event-sentence by the object-sentence, philosopher D. Davidson suggested accepting existence of both objects and events. Though, there are other analytically relevant problems with speaking and thinking of events, such as quantification, identification and structure of events. For example, from the point of view of the structure, the three-componential event «the meeting of R. Nixon and Mao Zedong in Beijing» cannot be the same as the two-componential event «the meeting of R. Nixon and Mao Zedong» although this people met only once. [5; 6]
However, scientifically oriented investigations into the processuality didn’t represent all contemporary philosophical discussions of the topic. Another source became the philosophy of life, especially the works of A. Bergson. The philosophy of life made a decisive turn in the direction of overcoming the scientific rationality and understanding of nature. It became an anti-scientist and anti-positivist trend in the continental intellectual culture, looking for new perspectives in exiting existential and cultural crisis. Here, life manifested to be put on the place of the ultimate value and ontological ground. Life is the real procreative invariant of every process and entity, and thinking and knowledge must implement its features to find the way to persist.
Another opposition for the new scientific positivism and naturalism in early 1900s made a German philosopher M. Heidegger. M. Heidegger is famous for his fundamental ontology of the «Being and Time» project. Early Heidegger urged the obliteration of the question of being in philosophy. He opposed metaphysical «disinterested» concept of the Supreme Being with thinking of Dasein, the being-there, temporal finite being of the hitherwards. In his later writings Heidegger sought for a possibility to bind being with time in a more vivid and profound way. This unity is what he calls «eventfulness». Since time is being timed from future, an ultimate possibility and horizon of which is death, every event is an opening of a crossing of the temporal and the eternal. [7, p. 240; 8] In his meditations on technique he also discusses the epochal «opening» and «closing» of being due to its oblivion. The ontic closure of the world can face eventfulness only in a form of a catastrophe.
Famous French philosopher G.Deleuze, who is very ambiguously recognized with respect to the postmodernism, has indigenously combined views of B.Spinoza, F.Nietzsche and A.Bergson into a prominent philosophy of becoming. He argued for the univocity of Being which consists of a virtuality of becoming. In his view, virtuality preponderates over actuality as the power of a dynamic chaos of being. It determines infinite plasticity of life and its immediate eventfulness. It is also the name for the unity of being. Scientifically cognized finite facts are mere static slices, which via their operational transparence obscure the dynamic being of difference. However, he admits that the scientific plan of reference can experience fluctuations of the underlying chaos and produce local anomalies and incompleteness.
While the concept by Deleuze implements a strong version of infinity and unity of being, the deconstruction is aimed at a maximal weakening of both. One of the paradoxical concepts by this branch of postmodernism became the «weak god». It rereads the story of Christ as of the one, whose crucifixion became the manifestation of an ultimate powerlessness and injustice, a claim without support, only in which rather than in miracles and demonstrations of a great power the divinity can reveal.  This unity of an evanescent existence with impotence is, obviously, an antipode of any type of «will-to-power» concepts and a carrier of a negative eventfulness of the undeconstructible. The theological motif here is the means to suspend a necessity and obviousness of the scientific discourse, which uncritically admits natural entities possessing positive properties. Postmodernists normally don’t trust the appellations and references to reality as well as they don’t maintain the strict divisions between discourses.
The contemporary critical theory shares the intention to reject naturalism too. Nature became a name for something, which cannot be overcome as a fate or destiny. In the view of the critical theorists, the concept of nature hides inside it the idea of a power secured from a political struggle, from discussion or decision making. Applying to nature means terminating further discussion, since race, sex, age etc. remain a matter of biology independently to political and communal decisions. Critical thinkers reject such closed use of «nature». Identities, destinies and relationships have to be open, hence the politically and culturally relevant nature as well. That means that regardless to the finitude and closure of the natural world the critical theory maintains the possibility and necessity of creating new worlds with new possibilities instead of realizing those prescribed by a world supposed to be real.
Summarizing all those confronting views and «ideologies» A. Badiou infers that one of the most difficult questions for the ontology of the modernity is producing a positive or affirmative concept of the infinite. Since this concept is crucial for the theory of the radical novelty, such possibility would indicate a significant role of events, which would have to be thought as those which interrupt the order of things and give birth to what had been impossible. The only adequate way to maintain an appropriate concept of event as the radical change, thus, according to Badiou, lies in a building the ontology on the base of the mathematical set theory, because it admits thinking of multiplicity, void and exception.  Here multiplicity would stand for a mode of presentation of being qua being, void – for the being’s proper name as no-one, on the base of relations to which the thinking of being and truth is possible; and exception would regulate the opening of being qua being or the existence of truths in the world. In his major writings Badiou demonstrates, that the existence of truths necessitates events as ruptures in the ontological order.
We can see in general that the change can be thought today in several ways. First, it can be taken absolutely classically as a realization of finite possibilities. This is the most trivial meaning of events. It is permitted in the analytical philosophy, for which the limits of the world coincide with the limits of the language, and in the scientific positivism. Whatever unusual happens, it has to be determined by the laws of nature, i.e. to be inscribed into causal chains. Second, in the vitalists’ view, the perpetually moving or during living matter is capable for indefinite mutations, transformations, becomings. Since, for the eternally becoming, it makes no sense to differentiate causes and effects, as well as the temporal modalities, there can be only an overarching eventfulness without determination and direction. It would be impossible to speak of an event as a rupture within this ontology. Third, in Heidegger’s vision, an event is always what happens in the history of the being rather than with scientifically or technically understood objects. Events are immediately connected to the opening and the closure of being, so there hardly is a method to study or register them. Fourth, there are also the critical theorists claiming for events as the interruptions in the causal chains. This is the revolutionary vision of the novelty, where the new is not something created in the world, but a new world with new created possibilities, when what had been impossible becomes possible. Fifth, deconstruction authors would deny that there can be a certain moment of event in the infinitely dispersing texture of references. As their ontology is conventionally multiple and pluralistic, such that the difference dominates over the identity, it would be difficult to elaborate a theory of a radical change. It shares with the analytical and naturalistic approaches the presumption of a gradual up to an absolutely relative change. All this suggests a deeper look into the metaphysical backgrounds.
There is a general reception within the contemporary philosophy, according to which an assumption that philosophy can elaborate by its own means consistent ontological propositions is identified as a metaphysical assumption. In regards like this, it is not the question about a possibility for ontology but rather a question on the possibility of metaphysics is of the main importance. One can say that in this respect the dominant tendency in all major contemporary philosophical traditions was a tendency of putting restrictions for metaphysical thinking. One can definitely find this tendency in a form of a program in the positivism and its most prominent successor the analytic philosophy, which devoted a long enough time of its development to the task of overturning the metaphysics and submitting ontology to the borders of science, refined from metaphysical reminders in turn. The later shift towards the semantics of the ordinary language and ontology of everyday life tended to re-submit metaphysical outcomes to broadly understood anthropology and psychology.
Independently to the positivists’ grounds, continental philosophers attacked metaphysics from very different directions. There at least can be recognized the Marxist and Post-Marxist ideological critics of metaphysics, the existential overturn and deconstructionism. Marxists redefined ontology in terms of material production, historical and dialectical materialism. Existentialists attempted to found ontology on the grounds of individual’s existence. Deconstructionism of different kinds submitted ontology to poetical potencies of language. One can recognize in these three approaches a tendency of abridging metaphysics up to its complete elimination in different forms of postmodern relativisms.
Other two topics, those of truth and subject, have being attacked at earliest starting from F. Nietzsche and at least from two flanks. First of all, again, these notions are under suspect in belonging to metaphysics, but this time in its gnoseological side. Secondly, they have been carefully eliminated from dominant discourses, including art, politics and science, and in the latter – starting from mathematics and up to the social sciences and humanities.
General objections against the metaphysical ontology and similarly gnoseology can be summarized in next rubrics: anti-transcendentalism, anti-essentialism and anti-foundationalism. Anti-transcendentalism consists of the critics of any appellation to some ultimate conditions of existence, knowledge or whatever else. The being of such ultimate conditions would be transcendental in two aspects. It, first of all, has to be inaccessible on and from the level of the conditioned. The distance here is infinite, and no passing from one being towards another one can ever lead to their totality and substantiality, to which one could only «transcend» i.e. «overstep» via some unordinary operation. Second, the ultimate conditions would have to be of an absolutely different nature having nothing in common with that of the conditioned. So, instead of speaking of being in one precise sense, transcendentalism just doubles the problem.
Although the ontological transcendentalism in the modernity became rare, the gnoseological transcendentalism raised and appeared strong enough to be easy to overcome. In a more simplified form it was enacted by the introduction of the psycho-physical dualism, attributed to Descartes. Subject has been conceptualized and put into consideration via this division of the reality into the physical and the mental domains. Respectively the counterpart of subject, id est object has had to enter the modern ontology. In Kant’s philosophy this division obtained a well-developed ground, wherefrom another version, that of the methodological transcendentalism, becomes possible. Kant pictured cognition as a process of constructing the reality without any means to claim about the world as it is outside our constructions. His theory also contributed to farther elaborating of the concept of subject as the presumably free acting agent of morality and social progress due to the claimed transcendental freedom of the rational will and self-consciousness. Thus, the ontological transcendentalism was overcome only for sake of the cognitive or methodological transcendentalism, recasting as the metaphysical any assumption about the reality as such beyond its descriptions and explanations.
Obviously, being thought radically, the methodological transcendentalism would sooner or later turn to concerns over the theoretical distinction between subject and object, because the former cannot be opposed to the later on the base of some fundamental relation or different nature any more. So, there can be at least two options: either to attempt a new conceptualization of subject, or to refuse this notion at all.
But, whatever decision would have to be maid, it couldn’t avoid involving the problem of truth. The far the classical distinction of subject and object has been maintained, the far the correspondent concept of truth could have been maintained, since this concept conditioning truth as the accordance of statements to facts. One can see that in the post-Hegelian idealism another concept of truth predominated. That was the condition of coherence between statements in a system, when a new statement is true if it doesn’t contradict to the established truths. This concept is widely implemented in mathematics. However, new approaches to the epistemology of thee natural science couldn’t be satisfied with this interpretation and starting from the logical positivism sought to refine the correspondence concept. The improvement has become a formulation, according to which the truth is rather the correspondence of a description to the observation. But, once it became clear that there can also be competitive descriptions corresponding to the same observation, one has to decide between them on independent criteria. Thus pragmatic vision has been complemented, according to which one has had to choose the most effective and relevant to a concrete task description or explanation.
Being taken independently, the pragmatic criterion could fundamentally recast the correspondence, because of concerning beliefs as practical means and actions, meanwhile an action cannot be true or false at all. Contemporary theorists regard communicative and discursive strategies as a means of creating rather than discovering truths. This vision has been promoted in the neo-pragmatism by Rorty [10, p. 3] and the formal pragmatics by Habermas [11, pp. 118-132]. Here truths can appear in two respects: first a truth is something which allows a participant to succeed in communication, and second, it is an achieved convention or consensus about the topic.
Another option was promoted in the Nietzsche’s perspectivistic concept of truth in a certain degree influenced existentialists’ subjective vision. Nietzsche argued that in opposite to the universalistic and objectivist claims truths cannot go for anyone. Instead, there are only individually suiting truths, which correspond to a personal physical and spiritual constitution. There are perpetual clashes of forces in history, and due to this there emerge incompatible compositions, which cannot be generalized and isolated from the reality in a figure of an eternal truth. As such the extramundane truth, according to Nietzsche, must be opposed via the vital untruth. Here the poetically oriented contemporary intellectuals draw inspiration for aligning untruth, fiction and creative invention against the dictate of prescribed «true» identities, objective values and meanings.
An understanding of truth, which has been at furthest from the epistemological receptions, had been introduced by M. Heidegger. His thinking of truth is completely ontological, that is that truth is an opening or clearing (German «Lichtung») of being. One can stay in this opening and thus human being is defined.
The second anti-metaphysical trend, anti-essentialism undermines the traditional categorical relationships between essence and appearance on the one hand and between essence and existence on the other. First, it rejects the idea that something can act as an essence for another thing. Second, anti-essentialism asserts inconsistency of asserting the precedence of essence before existence. In both aspects the preference given to essence is recognized as a source of the troubles.
But, where this concept of essence originates from? The word «essence» or Latin «essentia» is produced from the word «to be», «esse», hence it, first of all, merely designates being. «Essence» means «being qua being» and it is to signify being as such. Though, a certain significant addition marks essence apart the being as such, and this addition concerns the sense or the meaning of being. «Essence» assumes that being qua being is being in the sense of being (and nothing else or in particular). Its distinction from appearance ascends to the discussion of the One and the multiple in the ancient Greek philosophy. It is easy to see, why Greeks admired the One: it’s because the One is as or the way it is, that is that its existence completely and perfectly coincides with its being, that its being is consistent. In opposite, the multiple, i.e. that, which has different parts, or sides, or temporal stages, appears in different aspects, exists in different senses and isn’t at any moment completely what it is, it in-consists. So, some earlier philosophers concluded, it necessitates a special vision in which being qua being would be accessible instead of the multiple of the apparent. The essence of a thing would from here on be understood as the identity of the being of that thing from the point of view of a final unity of all its appearances. That this identity precedes a thing could be inferred from the persisting similarities between things, which in turn just came and passed away.
To recast the claim on essences’ independent being, contemporary philosophy holds different strategies. The first is to explain identity and integrity without referring to a hypothetical essence. This includes not only an overcoming of the Platonism of models and copies, but Aristotelianism of substantial or «inner» and accidental or «outer» qualities as well. The naturalistic approach, for instance, maintains that, first, there is only the nature, and, second, there is nothing essential among the natural objects, the qualities of which are to be studied and understood in a fairly external way of their interactions with each other. In the systemic approach, the essences or identities of entities are defined purely via their structures and relations within the systems they belong to. The second strategy is to reject the idea of a fixed identity. Here identity is a matter of an arbitrary choice in a particular situation, when the proceeding through the differences is being violently interrupted. Identity at the most is the side of a description of the reality, but it doesn’t rule the reality. Reality has nothing to identify with, and it is pregnant with inconsistencies and irregularities due to motions and fractal structures. Although there can be discovered certain repetitions and regularities in the nature and embraced by the notion of the laws of nature, it doesn’t seem that they can be put to support some identity mechanism in the world. Moreover, there are always many ways to suspend the claims that the world is the same as it is said to be. Concerning the social identities, then there are least controversies that all identities are being constructed.
At last, anti-foundationalism is concerned with the use of being in whatever sense – be it a being of facts, immediateness of the present and so on – in order to rely on it whatever claims. There are different types of rejection of the foundational vision. For example, existential thinkers deny that individual existence and existential choice have a meaningful foundation in reality. Late Wittgenstein argued that language is foundationless too. Constructivists deny any determinations from without the cognitive processes. Anti-foundationalism is, thus, the most threatening for the classical epistemological concepts of truth and subject.
Once the metaphysical ontology is discredited, there remain two questions. First, is ontology as such inevitably metaphysical in the mentioned above way? Second, if there can be a non-metaphysical ontology, what it is like?
In contemporary philosophy, the conceptualization of the problem of being was put to be relied on what can and cannot be expressed with language and on relation between the former and the later. For the logical positivists, nothing meaningful can be said about being as well as about non-being as such. Quine puts his relevant theorem in such way: “To be is to be the value of a bounded variable”. [12, p. 15] One can see that this consideration restricts the meaning of being with a realm of things or material objects and relations. The more radical reception is represented by the «linguistic philosophy», which is attested either as an anti-realism or as a linguistic transcendentalism. The reason for such attributions is that those intellectuals from the analytical tradition reject any possibility to speak of the reality outside language. According to them, language is the ultimate origin of ontology.
The exemplary existentialists’ approach pinpoints an openness of being as being, which is significantly unfolds itself in the indeterminacy of the concept of being. Heidegger argued that via introduction of a true supreme being metaphysics didn’t resolve the problem at all, but rather in addition distracted from the question and obliterated it.
In views of postmodernists, who are usually also associated with anti-realistic linguistic trend, there is no possibility of thinking an immediate being in its pure presence. Representation as the only given disseminates an effect of presence between signifiers. Every set of signifiers lacks totality and consistency, hence providing its components with neither efficient identity nor authenticity.
Post-metaphysical revisions of the problem of truth, as we could see, in one or other way separate the question of truth from the question of cognition and relation to reality. The far a reality can be just a subjective or social construction, the less respects to problematizing the relationship between knowledge and its object.
Though, consequently, the less the notion of subject of knowledge is suitable for epistemology, the more prominent are the problems of the moral, the psychological, the political or the artistic subject. First of all, the critical attention here is being drawn to the Kantian «free-will subject», which is a key to the possibility of morality and free choice in general. The scientific disproval of a possibility to make independent conscious decisions contradicts to personal experiences, so it can be supposed that individuals are directed – by brains or by social structures – via the illusion of freedom of thought and will. Whatever experiences of an internal freedom are, there are moral reasoning against farther study of brain-personality relationship in human, because it can be destructive for social interactions ruled by moral values, duty and responsibility. That is to protect the society one needs to secure the free moral subject. By the way, this type of subjectivity has been violently attacked not only from science, but from philosophy – Nietzsche, Foucault – and psychoanalysis as well. These facts suggest a revision of morality as such, due to supposition that it is just a useless metaphysical remainder.
Nonetheless, besides the postmodern manifestation of the «death of subject», there can be found prominent concepts, which defiantly re-introduce the classical Cartesian subject into the total cultural sphere. The major figure here was a French psychoanalyst J. Lacan, who claimed that the modern scientific rationality had become a product of a foreclosure in the symbolic order, due to which the unconscious was discovered by Freud. That foreclosure consisted of the demand imposed on speaking individual to left aside his or her personal contents while speaking of facts. This has to become a non-psychological concept of a subject. The concept by L. Althusser was very close to that by Lacan. Although, both were creatively re-elaborated by contemporary critical theorists, like, for example, J. Butler, who contributed with concepts of multiple subjectivity, there can be traced more «orthodox» Lacanian and Althusserian trends, represented by S. Zizek, J-A. Miller, E. Balibar, J. Ransiere and A. Badiou. Their approaches demonstrate that against the structuralists and postmodernists claims a non-transcendentalist, non-essentialist and non-foundationalist theory of subject is possible.
Badiou’s subject can be interpreted as an orientation of a certain construction. So, it is rather formal than psychological or cognitivist. Subject is given birth by event, that radical rupture in a texture of being and appearing, and in a sense becomes a subject-truth (truth as a subject). A truth is never a knowledge, but an excess (it cannot be grasped with language and cut from its generic-multiple being thus always making a remainder) and exception (it is not a body and not a language). That is why it makes a real change, the new possible. A whole enterprise is to examine the extents in which, for example, contemporary science or politics rely on truths. That is also the question about their attentiveness to event and capability for true subjects. Yet, since the polyvalence of multiple-being, Badiou complements science and politics with art and love. To put it short, these four realms made the major contexts of contemporary use of the word “subject”. No need to provide a sophisticated argumentation for sakes of a political, scientific, artistic or amorous significance of a true subject. On the base of the set theory Badiou demonstrates that truths and subjects are ontologically possible. In his Ethics he demonstrates their necessity and desirability. At last, in Logics of Worlds , he gives a systematic description of how subjects and truths appear in a world. What the four domains are invoked to show is that an orientation with respect to a possibility of a radical change is never mere theoretical, but involves stances and responsibility in relation to creativity, freedom and genuine amorous experience. Thinking of a possibility of truths can be the hallmark task for philosophy as such and its historically invariant contribution. In the contingent and sometimes hopeless from a particular «regional» perspective situation the affirmation of the possibility of truths can be realized as a radical intervention, a breakthrough, which is the most radical definition of event.
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